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4Introduction to Financialisation
1. What is financialisation and why  
 is it important?
Financialisation is a relatively new term, which covers such a range of phenomena that 
it is difficult to define precisely. The most-cited definition, from Gerald Epstein, states: 
“financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial 
actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies”1. 
This broad definition reflects the multi-faceted nature of the financialisation process. The 
concept unveils the interconnectedness of the global political economy and illuminates 
the unprecedented influence that financial intermediaries and technologies exert over 
our daily lives. Financialisation involves changes to our economy and society at three 
basic levels: within the financial sector itself, within productive industry and its relation to 
finance, and within the ‘average’ household. 
The USA is at the epicenter of financialisation and the role of the US dollar as an 
international reserve currency  - the currency countries use to trade with each other and 
to ‘store value’ in their central banks - has meant that developments in the USA affect the 
rest of the world. Furthermore, all countries are impacted by financialisation through the 
power and influence of global financial markets. 
One of the immediate reasons why financialisation matters is that the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis and the subsequent global recession was a consequence of this multifaceted 
process. Financialisation continues apace and is likely to cause further crises. Generous 
quantitative easing policies in the US, Japan and Britain, for example, have pushed 
financial asset prices above pre-crisis levels. Even the Bank of International Settlements is 
warning that private sector debt and leverage has swelled to a dangerous point again. As 
the 2013 UN Trade and Development Report noted: “The dominance of finance over real 
economic activities persists, and may even have increased further. Yet financial reforms 
at the national level have been timid at best [… while] reform has all but disappeared from 
the international agenda”2. 
5KEY CONCEPTS
QUANTITATIVE EASING is a monetary policy where central banks buy long-term 
bonds from private investors, like pension funds or insurance companies, 
using newly created (digital) money. The aim is to inject liquidity into financial 
markets and keep interest rates low. Governments hope that this will 
encourage borrowing and jump-start demand in the economy. The Bank of 
England found, however, that gains from quantitative easing have mainly 
benefited the wealthy.
LEVERAGE is the ratio of a company’s debt to the total value of its equity 
(assets minus liabilities such as loans or outstanding payments to a supplier). 
Increasing leverage means companies take on more debt despite the value of 
their equity remaining unchanged. A company may choose to use borrowed 
money to increase investment (with the aim of boosting profits) if credit is 
cheap and/or if the interest paid is tax deductible. Leverage can prove risky 
(leading to default) if investments go wrong or asset prices fall - like in the last 
financial crisis.
What an individual or company owns is their ASSET.  A house is an asset, as 
is crude oil. Financial instruments - such as stocks and bonds - can also be 
considered assets. People and companies can use assets to borrow money 
against. It works as the collateral for a loan. Yet if asset prices fall, then the 
value borrowed may be more than the value of their property and they could 
face bankruptcy if they can’t repay their loan.
Apart from its role in the global economic crisis, research has shown that financialisation 
has increased inequality, slowed down investment in ‘real’ production, mounted 
pressures on indebted households and individuals, and led to a decline in democratic 
accountability. Clearly the impacts of financialisation have far-reaching implications for 
human wellbeing, but there is also the possibility for citizens across the world to resist 
the ‘hegemony of finance’ and push for change. Such changes will not only depend on 
mobilisation, but also on greater understanding of the problems and challenges we face.
Financialisation has increased inequality, slowed down investment 
in ‘real’ production, mounted pressures on indebted households and 
individuals, and led to a decline in democratic accountability.
62. How have global financial markets changed?
While the beginnings of financialisation can be traced back to the 1950s, it was the fall 
of the Bretton Woods monetary system (defined by the use of gold-backed dollars as 
the international currency, fixed exchange rates, and limited capital mobility) in the 
early 1970s that accelerated growth in global liquidity and prompted a surge of financial 
liberalisation and deregulation. Floating exchange rates and unregulated capital flows 
presented hazards for many, but also provided opportunities for financial innovation 
(such as derivatives) to deal with these risks and for speculation to profit from them. 
The value of global financial assets soared. Not only did financial markets grow in absolute 
terms, they also expanded in relative terms: the value of global financial transactions 
rapidly surpassed that of ‘real’ production and commerce. For example, in 1973, the ratio 
of the value of foreign exchange transactions to global trade was 2:1, in 2004 this ratio 
reached 90:14.
New technology has played a critical role in the expansion of finance. For example, 
computerised trading is said to account for around 70% of financial “market activity” 
in the USA and just below 40% in Europe. High-frequency trading, as it is known, uses 
algorithms to sell or buy financial assets in fractions of seconds. Whilst in the 1960s, 
shares were held for about four years, nowadays “the average share” is “held for around 
20 seconds”6. Information technology also facilitated ‘credit scoring’ and computational 
statistical models that enabled mass lending, previously hampered by banks reliance on 
time-consuming personalised credit risk assessments.
The expansion of financial markets is not only about the volume of financial trading, but 
also the increasing diversity of transactions and market players. In short, financialisation 
must be understood as radical transformation within the financial sector that has altered 
entire economies - from the household and the firm to the functioning of monetary 
systems and commodity markets.
THE END OF THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM
The USA, freed from the commitment to maintain dollar-gold convertibility, could now 
pay its debts with its own currency without significant constrictions in supply. The US 
deficit increased rapidly and with it the number of dollars or dollar-denominated financial 
assets in circulation, most of which ended up in the reserves of other country’s central 
banks. Increased reserves allowed these banks to expand credit in their own economies 
and “world liquidity surged”. This opened up new profit making possibilities in private 
financial markets, and those seeking to capitalise pushed for the dismantling of barriers 
to capital mobility and other regulations that limited their activities.3
73. How has banking changed under the  
 process of financialisation?
Banking has changed dramatically in recent decades from the vision most people have 
of a local bank providing services of loans and savings for individuals and businesses. It 
now involves loans being repackaged, sold and traded, and speculation in global markets. 
Under financialisation, we have seen the emergence of a ‘shadow banking system’ (SBS) - 
new types of financial institutions and practices (e.g. securitisation) that are not subject to 
the same regulations as traditional commercial banks. The SBS represents “more than a 
quarter of the entire financial system” and, as of 2011, was “bigger than it was before the 
financial crisis, despite growing efforts by regulators to rein it in”7. 
At the same time, many commercial banks have turned to households and investment 
banking (themselves getting involved in the SBS) as new sources of profit. In large part, 
this was a response to the loss of customary sources of income as corporations became 
more adept at seeking funds in financial markets and thus reduced their reliance on 
bank loans. It was this blend of ‘financialised personal income’ and investment banking 
practices that created the giant financial bubble and later crisis in 20088.
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INVESTMENT BANKS act as market intermediaries, offering financial services 
to large firms. For example, if a property developer wants to build a series 
of luxury housing blocks in London, it needs to find the capital to buy the 
land, sponsor the development, and advertise the investment. To raise this 
capital it will go to an investment bank that will help the company develop a 
financial security and sell this security to investors. Investment banks will often 
‘underwrite’ the offerings of these securities. They also engage in ‘trading’, i.e. 
buying financial instruments for the short-term in order to sell on to others. 
In contrast, COMMERCIAL BANKING is about taking deposits and lending to 
consumers and businesses; thus commercial banks should have large reserves 
in case of defaults on long-term debts. The Glass-Steagall Act had forbidden 
the mixing of investment and commercial banking in the USA, but was 
repealed in 1999.
SHADOW BANKING institutions such as hedge funds, mutual funds and 
structured investment vehicles do not take deposits, but like commercial 
banks provide credit-type services to other banks and large companies. In 
that sense, shadow institutions are similar to investment banks, but are 
differentiated on the basis that they operate without government regulation 
and monitoring or in the ‘shadows’. Many regulated commercial and 
investment banks engage in unregulated shadow banking activities through 
(e.g.) subsidiaries. Because shadow banks aren’t regulated in the same way 
as normal investment and commercial banks, they can often raise and lend 
money more easily, though with substantially more risk. 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS are financial firms or organisations - including 
pension, hedge and mutual funds, investment banks and insurance companies 
- that trade and/or hold large quantities of financial assets. Institutional 
investors buy financial securities (bonds and stocks) directly, allowing 
companies to bypass banks when looking for funding. In the UK and the USA, 
institutional investors have come to own or manage around 70% of the stock 
market.9 Institutional investors not only concentrate market power, but also 
typically have short-term horizons (e.g. fund managers are often judged on 
quarterly performance) and are characterised by ‘herding’ behaviour.10
94. What are the main impacts of ‘liberalised’  
 capital flows and currency markets?
According to UNCTAD, between 1980 and 2007 international capital flows expanded from 
$500 billion to $12 trillion. During the same time period, foreign exchange (FX) trading 
grew to become the biggest market in the world. This reflects the trend of capital account 
liberalisation - the removal of barriers to the free flow of capital in and out of the country 
and full exchange rate convertibility- and financial liberalisation more generally, since the 
1980s and 1990s. 
The IMF and other institutions had encouraged governments to dismantle capital controls, 
arguing that this would allow for a more efficient allocation of capital and thus encourage 
economic growth. ‘Developing’ countries, in particular, were supposed to benefit from 
capital inflows, given that, theoretically, investors would be attracted to the higher returns 
available in ‘capital-scarce’ economies. 
Reality has proved quite far removed from the theory. First, there has been no robust 
evidence to support the claim that capital account liberalisation has positive impacts on 
growth11. Second, evidence does suggest that free capital movements have resulted in 
unprecedented volatility of exchange rates, stock market values and interest rates, and 
consequentially greater instability, including a greater probability of financial crises. Third, 
in the 2000s, capital flowed from ‘developing’ to ‘developed’ economies, rather than the 
other way around. In the wake of the global financial crisis from 2008, the IMF changed its 
stance to one of acceptance of capital controls - perhaps an implicit acknowledgement of 
the problems wrought by its earlier policy recommendations.
Short-term speculative interests play a central role in determining the direction of vast 
movements of global capital and – as such - foreign exchange rates. Instability can follow 
as investors move their money from place to place looking for better returns. A hasty 
inrush of capital may whip up a financial bubble, while a sudden outpour can exacerbate 
or even cause economic crisis. For example, rising interest rates in one country may cause 
capital to flock there to reap the benefits, leading to capital outflows in other countries. 
To complicate matters further, investors may engage in a ‘carry trade’, or borrow in the 
currency with a low interest rate in order to buy financial assets (e.g. stocks or bonds) 
or lend in the currency offering higher interest rates. The capital inflow caused by this 
arbitrage trading may lead the currency of the target country to gain value, which can 
negatively impact on exports (by making them less competitive in terms of prices) 
and only reinforces the speculative trend since investors may now gain from currency 
appreciation as well as interest rate differentials. The capital inflows may also cause 
inflation (as the inflow of capital may expand the money supply without necessarily 
increasing production), which is difficult to tackle given that raising interest rates would 
strengthen incentives for arbitrage further. This is just one example of how free capital 
flows limit national policy choices.
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Essentially, countries are vulnerable to crises with external 
origins (at least partially) beyond their control.
KEY CONCEPT 
In the CARRY TRADE firms borrow in one currency at a low interest rate in 
order to lend or invest in another with a higher interest rate (to profit from 
the interest rate differential). Because interest rates tend to be higher in 
‘developing’ countries, these have become a key target in the carry trade, 
especially those with appreciating currencies (often this appreciation is caused 
by the carry trade itself because the inflow of capital attracted by the high 
interest rates translates into demand for the currency). Short-term loans in 
foreign currencies can increase pressure to hold large reserves, which imply 
significant costs, especially for people in the Global South (see box below).
If, or when, the carry trade - and as such the inflow of capital - is reversed (perhaps due 
to a sudden loss of confidence or a rise in interest rates in the funding country) it can 
cause enormous upheaval. A depreciation or devaluation of the target country’s currency 
may be a cause or effect (or both!) of the capital outflows. Either way, participants in 
the carry trade who were not able to ‘pull out’ of the market before the depreciation or 
devaluation (which often include firms and banks from the target country itself) may not 
be able to pay back their debts in the loan currency which is now more expensive, leading 
to defaults, bankruptcies and possibly a wider credit crunch. It is worth noting that some 
speculators may have placed bets in the opposite direction and therefore stand to profit 
directly from the currency depreciation or devaluation. The Asian debacle of the late 
1990s is the most cited example of the destructive impact of a carry trade ‘unwinding’, 
but this form of interest rate arbitrage/currency speculation also played a role in the 2008 
global financial crisis12. 
The risks inherent in capital account liberalisation might make sense if the policy paid 
off, but according to UNCTAD, “unrestricted capital inflows generally have not been 
accompanied by a sustained increase of investment in real productive capacity; nor have 
they led to higher and more stable GDP growth rates”. The reality is that most short-term 
capital flows and currency trades are speculative or have nothing to do with interest in 
real trade or productive investment abroad.
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The value traded on foreign exchange markets in less than a week  
is more than what is sold in goods and services in an entire year!
GRAPHIC 2  
COMPARISON OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRADING  
WITH TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES
The difference between the global financial markets and an ordinary 
casino, as pointed out by Susan Strange, is that people choose whether 
or not to take risks at the card table, whereas “casino capitalism” drags 
us all into the game involuntarily.15
KEY CONCEPT 
CURRENCY DERIVATIVES - the majority of foreign exchange (FX) trading is 
accounted for by OTC derivatives contracts. Since the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system, more and more countries have abandoned fixed or pegged 
exchange rates and allowed - at least to a certain extent - the value of their 
currencies to be determined by supply and demand in the market. This implies 
constant fluctuations in exchange rates, which pose risks for firms across the 
globe. These companies may use FX derivatives as a sort of insurance (a way 
to ‘hedge’) to protect themselves them from potential losses due to exchange 
rate swings. However, many investors use FX derivatives not as ‘insurance’ 
or a protection strategy, but instead to place bets on particular currency 
movements.
OTC literally means OVER THE COUNTER, rather than through a formal 
exchange. Because OTC trading by definition is that which does not take  
place on a formal exchange, it is much harder to monitor and regulate.
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CASE STUDY 
Speculation “insurance”- how foreign exchange 
reserves lead the South to subsidise the North16,18
In response to the capital flow and exchange rate volatility experienced in the 
1990s, many countries have adopted a strategy of ‘protection’ by accumulating 
foreign exchange reserves. These reserves can be used to defend the 
exchange rate by buying currency on open markets and to counteract other 
implications of sudden capital outflows; for example, the reserves provide a 
sort of ‘insurance’ against default on short-term external debt obligations. 
A large share of these reserves is held as US public debt, reflecting the 
dominance of the dollar as international currency and the presumed ‘safety’ 
of US government securities. 
Though China is by far the largest holder of foreign reserves, the trend is 
evident across Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa. As a result of 
this international reserve accumulation, net flows to ‘developing’ countries 
were negative between 2000 and 2008. In effect, this means that many middle 
income and poor countries became positive net lenders to wealthy countries - 
principally the USA.
In response to the capital flow and exchange rate volatility experienced in the 
1990s, many countries have adopted a strategy of ‘protection’ by accumulating 
foreign exchange reserves. These reserves can be used to defend the exchange 
rate by buying currency on open markets and to counteract other implications of 
sudden capital outflows; for example, the reserves provide a sort of ‘insurance’ 
against default on short-term external debt obligations. A large share of these 
reserves is held as US public debt, reflecting the dominance of the dollar as 
international currency and the presumed ‘safety’ of US government securities. 
Reserve accumulation may sound like a wise policy, but it has major economic 
and social implications. First, countries renounce the possibility of using 
considerable portions of export earnings and capital inflows for productive 
investment or social spending, and instead divert them to amassing giant 
foreign exchange reserves or what is essentially a pricey insurance plan against 
speculative currency attacks and sudden capital flow reversals. 
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Second, the earnings on these reserves tend to be lower than what the 
government spends in order to upkeep the strategy. As noted by Painceira, 
“while developing country international reserves have increased enormously, 
their short-term external debt has also risen substantially”. The costs of 
borrowing abroad are determined by commercial rates, but the payment 
received for lending abroad (or the interest earned on US government securities 
held in reserves) is low. Estimates of the cost to ‘developing’ countries vary: 
some suggest that it is close to 1% of GDP, while others put the annual loss at 
circa $100bn19.
Third, most countries also have to ‘sterilise’ the potential inflationary effects 
of reserve accumulation. This means issuing government bonds (increasing 
domestic public debt), in order to absorb liquidity or remove money from 
circulation. These domestic bonds are usually issued at higher rates than the 
US government bonds held in reserves; the difference in interest rates, once 
more, means a loss for developing countries.
In 2008 the net flow  
of capital from developing 
to developed economies 
reached over USD  
$800 BILLION
Sub-Saharan Africa  
increased its international  
reserves from USD  
$35.5BN  
in 2001 to  
$163.5BN  
in 2008.
Reserve accumulation in 
“developing Asia” (excluding 
China and India) rose from USD  
$113.4BN  
in 2000 to  
$320.2BN  
in 2007.
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5. What is securitisation and how does it work?
Securitisation is the single most important innovation driving contemporary finance. It 
was described by British newspaper The Guardian as the “crack cocaine of the financial 
services” sector. Securitisation is the transformation of streams of future income into a 
financial security ready to sell straightaway. To give one example: rather than wait year 
after year for royalties on his records, David Bowie sold a financial security - a Bowie 
Bond - that investors could buy. Bowie gets the money straight away, the investor gets 
the royalties year on year. Securitisation can be applied to anything with a regular flow 
of income: mortgages, student loans, water services, road tolls, telephone bills, export 
earnings, wages of a sports star, tax revenues, or even ‘sustainable’ forest management. 
It means that rather than wait 25 years for a student loan to be repaid, for example, the 
loan company can sell off the rights to the repayment (at a discount) and get the money 
back straight away. 
This has two main effects. First, securitisation means finance is forever looking for new 
sources of future income to transform. The game is to find assets and bundle them up 
in a way that (allegedly, at least) makes their income predictable and steady. Investors in 
securities like these, however, are essentially speculating: nobody can be sure Bowie will 
remain popular, just as nobody could be sure that subprime mortgages would be repaid.
Second, securitisation means there is no time to waste in issuing new loans. If a bank 
lends a company £1m and expects £100,000 back a year, rather than wait 10 years for 
its loanable funds to be replenished, it can sell a security for £900,000 straight away, 
and carry on lending. This means there is much more liquidity, allowing greater levels of 
borrowing in the economy. 
KEY CONCEPT 
SECURITIES are tradable financial instruments that represent either a debt 
owed (such as bonds or collateralised debt obligations - CDOs) or equity 
implying a real or potential ownership stake in a firm or asset (such as stocks 
or stock options, which reserve the right to buy a stock at a certain price on a 
particular date). The term ‘securitisation’, however, is not typically applied to 
the creation of traditional stocks and bonds, but rather new types of financial 
instruments that convert an income stream - such as mortgage repayments or 
telephone bills - into a security to be bought and sold.
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Securitisation has been applied to an enormously diverse range of assets. For example, 
migrant’s remittance payments and commodity export earnings have both been converted 
into collateral for financial assets (securities)20 – with the backing of institutions such as 
the IMF21. Future-flow securitisations allow public and private entities access to low-cost 
credit in global capital markets, detached from official credit ratings and the economic 
performance (e.g. foreign exchange reserve levels) of their government. While it is argued 
they can improve liquidity, the risks are similar to those inherent in the securitisation of 
mortgages.
6. How did securitisation of mortgages lead  
 to the US financial crisis?
US firms Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are said to have first used the securitisation 
technique in the 1970s in order to resell home mortgages to outside investors. Mortgage-
backed-securities were at the heart of the 2007/2008 financial crisis. In basic terms, 
mortgage securitisation involves a commercial bank selling a bundle of mortgages on 
to an investment bank, which creates a ‘special purpose vehicle’ or ‘entity’ (SPV or SPE) 
that pools and then splices the income from these mortgage payments into securities 
to be sold to investors. Investors choose from securities with different risk levels and 
corresponding rates of return. The income generated by the mortgage payments are 
used to pay interest and principal to the lowest risk ‘tranches’ first; high(er)-risk tranches 
only receive payments if and once the other (preceding) tranches have been paid-off . 
This is called the ‘originate-and-distribute’ scheme: banks ‘originate’ the mortgages and 
then distribute them onto others. This allows banks to shift credit risk off their balance 
sheet, plus the proceeds from the sale can be re-loaned onto other customers. Banks 
may also gain by charging fees for originating the mortgages. The investment bank earns 
the difference between what it paid for the bundle of mortgages and the amount it sells 
the securities for. (In some instances, rather than selling on to an external investment 
bank, the commercial bank itself creates a special purpose vehicle in order to conduct 
securitisation directly.) 
US mortgage lending grew considerably between 2001 and 2006. Once demand from 
the more ‘credit worthy’ segment of the population was met, the market turned to the ‘subprime 
sector’ or the poorest homebuyers, enabled by securitisation techniques. As interest rates 
went up and house prices fell, people start defaulting on mortgage payments. A collapse 
of the subprime market, on its own, could not have caused a general financial crisis. 
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A large part of the problem was mortgage securitisation: specifically, “particles of subprime 
debt […were] embedded in securities held by financial institutions across the world”22. 
Furthermore, a lot of people had taken out extra loans by re-mortgaging their houses 
on the basis of rising prices (known as ‘equity extraction’), which they were now unable 
to pay. Finally, many financial institutions had taken positions in ‘credit default swaps’ - a 
type of derivative seen as a means of hedging potential losses or simply speculating on 
the performance of mortgage-backed securities and other types of collateralised debt 
obligations. Thus the financial system built layers of debt and bets on top of securities 
that ultimately depended on individual homebuyers paying their mortgages.
7. What are derivatives and how do they work?
Derivatives are financial contracts that derive ‘value’ from the performance of some 
‘underlying’ factor. This underlying factor doesn’t even have to be a ‘thing’: for example, 
weather derivatives allow one to hedge against or speculate on hurricanes, frost and 
snowfall, or the amount of sulphur in the air. Unlike securities, which imply a claim on 
future income streams, derivatives represent an “exchange of performance exposure, 
where gains and losses are expressed simply in the changing price of the derivative itself”23. 
Most derivatives contracts are officially considered risk management or hedging tools. 
However, ironically, the use of derivatives to hedge against volatility has itself become 
a source of volatility, while speculation on derivatives markets depend on volatility for 
profit making. 
There are four main types of derivatives: forwards, futures, swaps and options. Basic 
agricultural forward contracts are perhaps the origin of derivatives, dating back to at 
least the 1600s- though centralised futures trading emerged much later, in the 1840s, 
with the establishment of the Chicago Board of Trade. In a ‘conventional’ forward contract 
a producer (e.g. farmer) promises to sell, and an end-user (e.g. chocolate company) 
promises to buy, a certain amount (e.g. ten tons) of a commodity (e.g. cacao beans) at 
a fixed price (e.g. $3,000 per ton) on a specified date in the future (e.g. June 1, 2018). 
This helps the farmer ‘hedge’ or protect against low prices and the chocolate company 
to guard against high prices. 
Standardised and tradable contracts offered by financial exchanges are known as futures, 
though the underlying principle is the same as in a forward. Futures offer protection (via 
the exchange, essentially an intermediary) against the other party defaulting, unlike 
private forward contracts. In the case of commodity derivatives, they also use standard 
quantities (e.g. ten metric tons of cacao beans) and usually apply ‘mark-to-market’ pricing. 
18
KEY CONCEPT 
‘MARK-TO-MARKET’, in the case of commodity futures, means that on a daily 
basis the contract is essentially ‘reset’ according to the prevailing ‘delivery 
price’ of the commodity in question. The party whom the price is moving 
against has to pay the price difference into a margin account (in which the 
investor deposits funds with the brokerage firm), while the counterparty 
receives that same amount. For example, if the original delivery price is 
$1,000 and the next day delivery prices are $950, the buyer’s margin account 
is debited the $50 difference, while the seller is credited with $50. The buyer 
would theoretically be paying $1,000 (as in the contract) or $50 more than 
the prevailing market price ($950); i.e. the markets moved against his future 
contract position. The same applies in the other direction: if the delivery price 
went up to $1,050 then the seller would be debited and the buyer credited.24
As suggested by their name, options contracts provide the ‘option’ to buy or sell at a 
certain price on a particular date, instead of an obligation. For example, suppose the 
cacao producer purchases a ‘put’ (sell) option contract for $100USD fee that gives the 
option to sell a ton of beans at $3,000 on a specified date or within a specific time frame. 
If - when the time comes - the ton is priced at $4,000, the cacao producer would choose 
not to exercise the option because he could get $1,000 more selling at the spot price. The 
producer lost the $100 USD paid for the option contract, but it could be a price worth 
paying given that the markets could have moved in the other direction. If the price had 
fallen to $2,000, the firm would exercise the option provided in the contract to sell for 
$3,000. Similarly the chocolate company might purchase a ‘call’ option to buy a ton of 
cacao for $3,000. A speculative trader would typically purchase a call (buy) option if they 
want to bet the price of the underlying asset will rise, or a put (sell) option to bet the price 
of the underlying asset will fall. 
It is worth noting that the institution that sells (‘option writer’) the contract IS obligated 
to sell or buy if the counterparty (‘option holder’) chooses to exercise the option, which is 
why this company charges a fee for the option contract.
The examples above focus on commodity derivatives; however, it is worth reiterating that 
these instruments trade in many other assets and areas such as interest rates, currencies, 
inflation, energy, weather, and so forth.
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In a credit default swap (CDS), for example, the seller promises to pay the buyer for the 
value of a debt if the debtor defaults. For this, the buyer must pay the seller premium 
instalments. Unlike conventional insurance, it is not necessary that those involved in the 
derivative exchange have any direct interest or involvement in the underlying debt. In 
short, using CDS derivatives, speculators external to a particular credit contract can make 
bets on the likelihood of default. These became very popular instruments during the 
financial bubble and played an important role in the crisis. Between June 2005 and June 
2007 the notional amount outstanding in credit default swaps rose from just over USD 
$10.2 trillion to $42.85 trillion25. A few years before the crisis, Alan Greenspan, head of the 
US Federal Reserve, celebrated the development of the CDS market, while government 
‘financial experts’ prevented these innovations from being regulated.
GRAPHIC 4
GROSS MARKET 
VALUE 
of the OTC derivatives 
markets, June 201326 
$20 tn
GROSS WORLD 
PRODUCT 
for 201327 
$73.87 tn
NOTIONAL AMOUNT 
OUTSTANDING  
in the OTC derivatives  
markets, June 201326 
$693 tn
Derivatives markets, even when measured  
by gross market value are enormous relative  
to gross world product. I.e. these financial 
instruments are supposedly ‘worth’ more than  
a quarter of all the products and services the  
world economy produces in an entire year.
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KEY CONCEPTS
The NOTIONAL AMOUNT OUTSTANDING (NAO) is the current value of the 
underlying assets represented in derivatives contracts not yet settled. So, the 
notional worth of a futures contract for 20 tons of cacao beans that have a 
spot price of $3,000 per ton would be $60,000 USD, or 20 x 3,000. In the case 
of a credit default swap, the NAO would be the amount of debt being secured. 
GROSS MARKET VALUE, in contrast, represents “the cost of replacing all 
outstanding contracts at current market prices”. It is a measure of the worth 
(related to changes in risk) of the derivative contract itself, rather than the 
underlying asset. In other words, the right to buy cacao beans at a specified 
price on a particular date (futures derivative contract) could suddenly become 
more valuable if an event occurs that makes cacao prices shoot up and if 
investors believe the price will continue to rise until the contract settlement 
date; in this case, the futures contract essentially guarantees access to low 
priced cacao in a high-price market. The person who owns this right to buy 
(holds the derivative) could sell the right onto another for a price - the market 
value of the contract.
8. So does securitisation and derivatives  
 trading control risk or create it?
Computerised risk modelling (used in the design of derivatives and securitisation) may 
appear rigorous and scientific, but the inferences used in these models (based on past 
prices) do not hold in unprecedented times of crisis where prices of different assets move 
in the same direction. In practice, these risk management techniques made financial 
players act en masse in similar ways, increasing instability and the likelihood of large 
price swings. 
Furthermore, the system has built in incentives that actually increased levels of risks and 
instability. For example, commercial banks had incentives to ignore the levels of risk in the 
original mortgage loan given the originate-to-distribute model. At the same time, credit 
ratings agencies were not only paid by banks to rate well, but their own risk assessments 
were also based on these flawed inference computations. Finally, as discussed below, the 
participation of financial speculators in commodity derivatives markets has undermined 
their potential for risk management, while contributing to volatility in ‘real’ markets. 
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How financialisation  
impacts commodity markets, 
food prices and the  
environment
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9. How has financialisation affected  
 commodity markets? 
Towards the beginning of the 21st century, and especially in the wake of declining returns 
on equities following the dot.com crash, financial market actors took increasing interest in 
commodity derivatives. Commodities are raw materials or primary agricultural products, 
such as gold, oil, copper, coffee, cacao, wheat, sugar or cotton. (Note that not all primary 
products are traded on international financial markets.) Historically, commodity prices 
have tended to change in line with - and thus provide a good hedge against- inflation and 
to move in the opposite direction of bonds and equities (though this was not true between 
2005 and 2008 when commodity and equity prices were positively correlated). This made 
commodities alluring to those wishing to protect against losses in other investments or to 
diversify their portfolios. The growing demand for commodity derivatives pushes up their 
prices, making them even more alluring to financial investors, creating a self-fulfilling 
cycle. 
KEY FACTS
Investment in US commodity futures indices (baskets of exchange-traded 
derivatives on a variety of commodities) rose from an estimated USD  
$13 billion in 2003 to USD $260 billion in 2008.28
The ‘notional value’ outstanding on OTC commodity derivatives contracts grew 
‘14-fold’ between 2002 and mid-2008, when it reached circa $13 trillion USD.29
The rapid growth in commodity derivatives trading was facilitated by deregulation such as 
the 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which reversed legislation implemented 
by the US government in the 1930s in response to the Wall Street crash. This, together 
with other decisions taken by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, weakened 
regulations that applied to the listed exchanges (e.g. reductions in and exemptions from 
‘position limits’) and opened the door to over-the-counter (unregulated) speculative 
trading without supervision or obligatory disclosure. This deregulation resulted from 
lobbying pressures by large financial enterprises. 
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The increased participation of financial investors and speculators has led to changes in 
the way these commodity markets now work, to a certain extent ‘de-linking’ them from 
physical market conditions and tying them more closely to movements in stocks and 
bonds. For example, index speculators take positions in commodities as an entire group; 
in other words, they do not usually make investment decisions according to supply and 
demand conditions in specific physical markets, but rather in relation to the performance 
of other financial assets. Such speculation is probably behind the simultaneous rise and 
fall of different commodity prices – not easily explicable by factors of supply and demand30. 
Also, speculators don’t have an interest in the commodities themselves. According to the 
FAO, just 2% of commodity futures contracts end with delivery of the physical good31.
Responsibility for the growing eminence of commodity derivatives, however, is not 
limited to external (financial) actors. Non-financial firms, especially international traders, 
have also increased their participation. Since the 1980s, policy-makers (with the backing 
of institutions such as the World Bank) have shifted emphasis from the “stabilisation of 
prices” through international commodity agreements, centralised marketing boards and 
cooperative schemes, to “private, market-based, price risk management strategies”32, 
especially derivatives trading. In practice, participation in derivatives markets is mostly 
limited to larger market players, which do not just use derivatives to hedge physical 
positions, but also derive a growing proportion of their profit from speculative trading.
The main problem with speculation in commodity derivatives is that it contributes to ‘real’ 
commodity price volatility. Labban argues, for example, that the price of oil is determined 
– to a considerable degree – by the sale of “fictitious barrels” on financial markets. 
He shows how oil prices rose by over 60% the first six months of 2008, reaching a high 
of $147 per barrel, despite a “decline in demand and increase in spare production 
capacity”33.  In other words, changing valuations in derivatives markets – which often 
do not correspond to the underlying supply and demand conditions of a particular 
commodity – may be translated into swings in physical market prices. 
Just 2% of commodity futures contracts  
end with delivery of the physical good.
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In addition to the wider implications of price volatility and crisis, the financialisation of 
commodities contributes to inequality between different actors within these markets. 
While some benefit from increasing volatility through speculation, others lose out. One of 
the main losers are the ‘traditional’ users of commodity derivatives since it has become 
more “costly and unpredictable for hedgers to use the futures markets for hedging 
purposes”34. In other words, commodity derivatives apparently no longer even serve the 
purpose for which they were originally designed. Regulations need to be put in place 
to ensure that these financial instruments serve traditional hedgers who actually have 
interests in the physical commodities. The problem is that strong lobbying by the financial 
industry has thus far prevented this.
Many small-scale producers and traders, especially in the Global South, were excluded 
from the outset. Apart from the problem of cost, participating in derivatives trading 
requires access to and minimum knowledge of financial markets. In addition, many small 
firms (traders or producers) do not use futures and options contracts to hedge because 
of the smaller commodity volumes they handle relative to the ‘lot sizes’ required on 
international exchanges. 
CASE STUDY 
Financialisation and Inequality in Coffee Markets
Examining the case of coffee (specifically in Uganda and Tanzania), Newman 
argues that financialisation has contributed to increasing inequality in terms 
of income and power within the commodity chain. Large international trading 
firms with sufficient funds, access, and knowledge to participate actively 
in financial markets have been able to gain from price volatility through 
speculation. Meanwhile, many medium sized traders were unable to compete 
financially and went bankrupt or were subject to take-overs. Finally, smaller 
(especially local) traders and producers tend to lose, as they must accept lower 
prices in return for stability or the risk implied by volatility.
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10. What role did speculative trading play  
 in the recent global food crisis?
The impact of speculative trading on food prices has been particularly severe, though 
the extent to which speculation was to blame for the recent global food crisis is hotly 
contested. 
The price of “internationally traded food” goods rose around 130% between the beginning 
of 2002 and mid-200835. These rising food costs are especially difficult for people in the 
Global South, where food purchases represent 60-80% of income. Subsequent to the 
food crisis, the number of people considered “undernourished and food insecure” rose 
by approximately 75 million. The crisis led to civil disorder in more than 40 different 
countries around the world and a significant increase in the costs of food imports for the 
50 “least developed countries”36. 
Commodity prices fell sharply after June 2008, in conjunction with the financial crisis, but 
from late 2009 they were back on the rise. For Kerckhoffs et al. it is clear that the steady 
injection (2003 to mid-2008) and then rapid withdrawal (later 2008) of speculative money 
in commodity derivatives markets was behind the inflation and then sudden bursting of 
the bubble37. 
11. What is the financialisation of nature?
As financial innovations are used to extend and deepen commodification in ever more 
areas, it is not just primary commodities, but nature more generally that is being 
financialised. Even immaterial ‘goods’ such as greenhouse gas emissions have become 
tradable on financial markets. 
The practice of emissions trading emerged in the United States in the 1970s as an attempt 
to limit sulphur dioxide contamination through ‘market’ mechanisms38. The idea behind 
‘cap and trade’, which is perhaps the clearest example of the financialisation of nature, is 
to create a market for pollution permits. In basic terms: a maximum pollution threshold 
is established (the ‘cap’ part), forming the basis for the creation of a limited number of 
permits, which can then be traded. 
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This trading takes many different forms (e.g. some involve pollution  ‘offsets’, where a 
company can compensate for its own emissions by reducing them elsewhere, such as 
by investing in a reforestation or a renewable energy project), but the basic underlying 
principle is the same: to create market incentives for reductions in pollution. Supposedly, 
more environmentally ‘sustainable’ companies can gain by selling unused quotas, while 
companies with unsustainable practices lose because they have to pay for additional 
allowances. 
Variations on this theme are used to ‘control’ air and water quality, and similar 
mechanisms have been designed (supposedly) to halt the exhaustion of marine life by 
creating tradable fishing quotas or rights. Once the initial markets have been created, 
this opens up opportunities for the development of derivatives (e.g. carbon options 
or proposed fishing ‘catch shares’ futures) that allow companies to hedge against, or 
speculate on, the prices of these tradable permits, quotas or credits39.
The financialisation of nature is encouraged by market-oriented environmentalists who 
view it as a way of increasing sustainability and by financial actors who see it as a new 
profit opportunity. However, in addition to debates surrounding the ethics of pricing and 
commodifying ecosystem ‘services’ and ‘goods’, growing evidence suggests that these 
financial ‘solutions’ fail to resolve environmental degradation and could actually aggravate 
the problem, as well as creating new social inequalities by putting the financial sector in 
control of common resources40 (see TNI ’s book: ‘What is Carbon trading and why does 
it fail?’). In the case of fishing, for example, ‘financialised’ fisheries management is often 
based on the expropriation -via the creation of privatised fishing ‘rights’- and exclusion 
of subsistence fishing communities (see: TNI Primer on  ‘The Global Ocean Grab’). Finally, 
there are fears that new forms of volatility and even crises could be unleashed in the wake 
of expanding ‘natural capital’ derivatives markets.
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How financialisation 
impacts on households, 
firms and the wider 
economy
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12. How does financialisation change  
 the wider economy?
Financialisation is a shift in the way wealth is accumulated. Whereas in the past profits 
were mostly derived from the mass production and sale of goods, in our financialised era 
a large proportion of profits come from the buying and selling of financial securities and 
the interest payments they accrue41.
A study conducted by the ILO covering 17 different countries found that the portion of 
profits represented by the financial sector rose to over 40% in 2005.43
Although the financial sector’s share in US domestic profits fell drastically during the first 
few years of the Great Recession, by 2010 it had recovered to almost 30%.44
Financialised accumulation profoundly affects how the economy works. If companies 
can make more from trading financial assets than manufacturing products, they may 
choose not to invest in new technology; or they may spend on expanding their finance 
department to the detriment of other areas. In other words, financialisation has been 
shown to negatively impact on ‘real’ investment. The trend is clear: where higher profits 
can be made through financial speculation, productive investment tends to decline. 
1960s
13.9%
1990s
25.3%
2006
36.8%
Financial firm’s share Non- financial firm’s share
GRAPHIC 5 
FINANCIAL FIRMS’ SHARE OF TOTAL (PRE- TAX) CORPORATE PROFITS, USA42
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CASE STUDY 
Financialisation reduces ‘real investment’ in US
A study of a large sample of US firms (1973-2003) by Ozgur Orhangazi 
discovered that financialisation impacts negatively on ‘real ’ investment or ‘real 
capital accumulation’. First, growing profitability in the financial sector relative 
to the non-financial sector “crowds out real investment”. Put simply, managers 
will invest in financial over other assets if it is more profitable to do so. Second, 
the growing transfer of earnings to the financial sector (through increased 
interest payments on debt, dividends distribution, and stock buybacks) 
reduces the portion of funds that can be reinvested in the firm, for example, in 
physical capital or research and development. 
Financialisation may also create a preference for the short-term gains offered 
by financial assets over the medium to long-term strategies usually required 
for real investment. This is reinforced by the need to service rising debt levels 
in many firms, shareholder demands for speedy returns, and stock option pay, 
which creates incentives to temporarily inflate the share price/earnings. 
Orhangazi is careful to point out, however, that these effects are not 
homogenous; for example, there are differences between large and small 
corporations and across different industries.45
Meanwhile, households have become increasingly reliant on credit in the face of declining 
or stagnating real wages and employment instability. Debt is now a major source of 
funding for people’s everyday spending, especially in countries like the US and the UK. 
In the past productivity increases were tied to wage growth, which allowed for rises in 
spending and thus demand and growth. Over the last few decades, in contrast, demand 
(and hence growth) has become increasingly reliant on greater indebtedness. 
Debt is not only used to sustain consumption, but also to fund financial investment 
and speculation. Many countries’ tax codes encourage companies to increase their 
indebtedness by allowing interest repayments to be counted as a cost, reducing overall 
Meanwhile, households have become increasingly reliant on 
credit in the face of declining or stagnating real wages and 
employment instability.
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profits that are taxed. Many companies raise finance from debt, rather than by issuing 
shares, because this allows them to maintain high profits per share, which helps keep 
share prices up. Both financial and non-financial firms have become increasingly reliant 
on credit for financial investments; this trend is especially evident in the USA, but is also 
matched in the UK, Japan and Ireland. 
KEY FACTS
In the USA, between 1976 and 2009, non-financial business debt rose from 
52% to 77% of GDP, household debt increased from 45% to 96%, and financial 
sector debts shot up from 16% to 111% of GDP.46
Overall, total outstanding US credit market debt increased from 140% of GDP in 
1973 to 328.6% in 2005.47
 
A number of studies have shown that debt-led growth, in addition to being inherently 
unstable and hence prone to crisis, is also ineffective in the long-run. Debt-led growth, 
however, is just one side of the story. For while financialisation has led countries such 
as the US and the UK to offset falling income levels with increased debt, others, such as 
Germany or China, have attempted to resolve similar demand problems by means of 
increased exports. 
It is sometimes argued that financialisation in the Global North simply reflects the shifting 
of production and manufacturing activities to other parts of the world (in the Global 
South), which leaves predominantly financial functions in multinational corporation’s 
‘home country’. However, Krippner found that US multinationals’ profits from foreign 
financial activities have increased relative to profits from overseas production. In other 
words, US companies appear to be bringing their ‘financialised’ practices with them 
to other countries. In sum, corporations are not only reaping profits from relocating 
production but also increasingly from a boom in financial activities overseas. In both 
cases, the benefits to countries in the Global South are limited and have contributed to 
the “persistence of the North-South divide”48.
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13. How are non-financial firms, such as  
 supermarkets, changing in the context  
 of financialisation? 
As Demir puts it: many non-financial companies have themselves “metamorphosed” 
into “financial rentiers”. A retail giant like Tesco may choose to buy up large parcels of 
land, speculating that rising prices mean it can sell the land later for a profit, without 
ever building a new outlet. Similarly, Sainsbury’s - another UK supermarket chain - now 
offers insurance and banking services to its customers. Such is the involvement of large 
(ostensibly non-financial) corporations in finance that many have their own departments 
specialised in financial activities. For example, in the case of Enron (discussed below), 
financial assets were so central in the business strategy that the company building had 
its own trading floor.
Krippner shows that since the 1950s, US non- financial firms, particularly manufacturing 
companies, have increasingly relied on financial income streams. According to another 
study, US non- financial firms’ financial returns (as measured by “interest and dividend 
income as a percentage of internal funds”) grew from 20% for most of the 1960s to a 
high of over 50% from the late 1980s on into the early 2000s.49 Around the same period, 
US non- financial corporations began to invest more in financial assets (like stocks and 
bonds) than they did in their own non- financial assets (like machinery). Their proportion 
of financial assets relative to ‘real assets’ increased from around 30% in the 1970s to over 
100% in the early 2000s.49 Various case studies – examining coffee traders, oil companies, 
agribusiness and auto- assembly firms – provide concrete evidence of the ‘financialisation 
of non- financial firms’ from across the world.50
Lapavitsas argues that the financialisation of corporations ties in closely to their reduced 
reliance on banks for credit and their pursuit of profit from unused funds. In other words, 
corporations sought ways to both lend and borrow money, and engaging in financial 
markets directly offered ‘lower costs’ and more ‘flexibility’ than going through banks. 
Gradually, non-financial firms developed financial ‘skills’ and “acquired functions that 
previously belonged to financial institutions”51. As discussed below, the financialisation 
of non-financial companies also relates to the imposition of shareholder value principles 
and the short-term profitability of financial relative to real investments. 
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CASE STUDY 
Enron and financialisation
Enron Corporation provides an emblematic case of the financialised firm. 
Originally focused on the distribution of natural gas and electricity, this energy 
company shifted to a more ‘innovative’ business model based on trading in 
the financial sector, especially in energy and weather derivatives. The media, 
academics and market analysts loudly applauded Enron’s creativity until its 
bankruptcy at the end of 2001. The financialised business model was not 
sustainable, leading Enron to engage in fraudulent activities. They “used 
legitimate accounting devices for the illegitimate purpose of hiding debt and 
fabricating earnings” in order to maintain optimism in the firm and sustain 
a rising share price, despite Enron’s poor performance. Though the Enron 
scandal is usually taken to be an example of criminal fraud and governance 
failure, it is illustrative of the wider process of financialisation.52
14. How does financialisation impact on  
 employment and income inequality?
The effects of financialisation on investment extend to employment. Businesses, of 
course, invest not just in equipment but also in their staff. Whereas in the past new job 
opportunities and expansion of productive activity would have been an indication of 
economic well-being, in the era of financialisation share prices often rise following the 
announcement of job cuts and physical capital downsizing. For example, in May 2014 
Hewlett-Packard’s stock prices rose more than 6% the day after it announced that it 
would cut between 11,000 and 16,000 jobs53. Furthermore, many businesses transfer the 
burden of capital market demands onto their workers, slashing wages and adding, in 
different ways, to the growing precariousness of employment. 
Real wage growth has been stagnating or declining in countries such as the USA and the 
UK over the last thirty-or-so years54. At the same time, managers and CEOs within the 
productive sector and top-level financial sector employees have seen their pay-packets 
swell, in large part due to stock option pay and bonuses – contributing to growing income 
inequality.
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KEY FACTS
In the USA “compensation per full-time equivalent employee in the security 
and commodity brokering industry increased from 146 percent above the 
national average in 1990 to 290 per cent above average in 2007”.55
One hedge fund manager received US$3.7 billion in just one year of ‘work’, 
circa 74,000 times more that the average US household income.56
If the impacts are negative for labour when finance is ‘doing well’, they are even worse 
when it isn’t. Workers were the group worst affected by the global economic crisis. 
Not only did unemployment grow across the Global North, but wealth inequality also 
continued to rise. Thus, in contrast to the Great Depression when inequality fell because 
of declining asset values held by a minority elite, in the contemporary Great Recession 
asset prices recovered relatively quickly (in part due to the help of government bailouts) 
and the wealthy got by relatively unscathed.
The increasing importance of the financial sector overall, combined with the growing 
reliance of non-financial firms on financial income relative to productive activities, seems 
to have made capital less dependent on labour for profits and thus further tilted the 
balance of class power. Still, it is important not to make overly simplistic generalisations. 
Drawing on evidence from the German automobile industry, Kadtler and Sperling show, 
for example, the continued importance of collective bargaining and trade unionism in 
influencing key decisions within some globalised and financialised firms57.
15. What is shareholder value and what  
 is its role in financialisation?
One of the most important aspects of financialisation is also one of the least well 
understood: shareholder value governance. Over the last forty years non-financial 
companies have become obsessed with their share prices, and seem to dedicate more 
resources to improving their share price than they do improving the products or services 
they sell. To do so, firms sell off divisions that are less profitable, fire staff, outsource 
services, and often spend vast sums buying their own shares. 
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Many argue that shareholders – investors on financial markets – have used the stock 
markets to force companies to prioritise shareholder returns above all other concerns; 
this is often called ‘shareholder value maximization’.58 If shareholders felt managers were 
not delivering high enough returns, they would sell the equity and take their money to 
a company that did. This market pressure is supposedly exacerbated by the fact that 
ownership of corporate stocks is concentrated in a few hands. If a big institutional 
investor decided to sell all the shares it owned, share prices could tumble. In this way the 
stock market – supposedly – left managers with no choice but to obsess over share prices. 
However the reality is that the big institutional funds, bar a few isolated incidents, have 
actually been unable to force their will on non-financial companies. More often than not, 
it’s easier for them to go along with management’s decisions than to challenge them. So 
rather than shareholders forcing managers to make share price the main priority, it is the 
managers of non-financial companies themselves that have led the change. 
In a financialised environment where lots of debt can be raised very quickly (thanks to 
securitisation), it is far easier to acquire companies, restructure them and sell off divisions 
than it is to try and build long term plans and improve productivity. In today’s age, many 
corporations’ main priority is to be able to borrow money quickly and easily, and a high 
share price is a good route to creditworthiness. The chase for high share prices and sound 
creditworthiness has made financial criteria - and financial experts and accountants - 
central to the strategies companies adopt. Accountants, not engineers, now decide what’s 
best for industrial companies. 
To compound matters, managers have tied their own salaries to share prices by paying 
themselves partly through stock options. So when share prices increase, so do their own 
salaries. 
The chase for high share prices and sound creditworthiness has 
made financial criteria - and financial experts and accountants 
- central to the strategies companies adopt. Accountants, not 
engineers, now decide what’s best for industrial companies. 
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KEY CONCEPT
SHARE BUYBACKS or STOCK REPURCHASES are when a company uses its own 
(or borrowed) money to buy its own shares back off the open market. It does 
this because greater demand for shares pushes up their price, so companies 
can ‘artificially’ increase their stock prices by buying substantial portions of the 
shares themselves. Traditionally, companies issued shares to investors so that 
they could finance big investments like new factories. Now they spend their 
own money buying back shares just so that their price remains high. Share 
buybacks are also supposed to inflate share earnings (or dividends); fewer 
shares imply company profits are distributed between fewer numbers, or 
more earnings per share.
KEY FACTS
As a percentage of US corporate profits, share buybacks rose from less  
than 5% in the late 1970s to a high of over 30% in 1992. In 2006, share  
buy-backs represented 43.9% of ‘non-residential investment spending’.59
The increase in share prices has also been boosted by general demand on the stock 
markets. This new demand is a result of the massive inflow of funds from households 
drawn into financial investment through pension plans or special saving schemes. Thus, 
as Froud et al. point out “with financialisation, stock prices are driven by the pressure 
of middle class savings bidding for a limited supply of securities”. This has made the 
underpinnings of recent shareholder gains extremely unstable. The authors even liken 
the operation of the US and UK financial markets to a giant Ponzi scheme: the income of 
existing shareholders largely depending on the continual entrance of new players60.
Overall, it is clear that financial markets have 
an enormous impact on corporate behaviour. 
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Overall, it is clear that financial markets have an enormous impact on corporate 
behaviour. In the race to increase share prices many corporate managers have begun 
to mimic financial market conduct – changing the disposition of the company towards 
‘short-termism’. Non-financial firms have chosen to seek new profit channels through 
financial activities, restructuring (e.g. outsourcing, takeovers and mergers) and financial 
engineering (e.g. share buy backs or tax dodges), instead of investing in new products or 
to improve productivity. 
16. How does financialisation affect  
 the ‘average’ household?
A lot of people have become more dependent on financial products for their wants and 
needs. Though use of credit by households is a not new phenomenon, household financial 
activities have changed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Individuals may be involved 
in financial markets through their insurance cover (health, home, car, life, unemployment), 
their pension plans, their savings schemes, their student loans, mortgages and different 
consumer borrowing options -overdrafts, short-term loans, credit cards. The reliance on 
loans, especially, has become habitual in many countries, the normality of credit card 
usage being an obvious example. Increasing use of and access to credit is sometimes 
treated as a symptom of affluence; however, it can also be viewed as the result of social 
pressures for maintaining or increasing consumption whilst facing stagnating or falling 
real wages.
As Montgomerie has described, retail banking innovations have integrated individuals 
and households into capital market networks whether they know it or not61.  For example, 
by securitising credit card and mortgage debt and selling these securities on international 
markets, retail banks brought consumers and households into direct contact with 
investment banking. This made consumer debt a very profitable and apparently secure 
activity and allowed for an increase in the credit available. 
KEY FACTS
The UK and the USA lead in household credit consumption: in 2007 ‘individual 
debt as a percentage of disposable income’ reached circa 160% and 130% 
respectively – in great part as a result of mortgage borrowing.62 
In Turkey debt payments as a percentage of ‘household disposable income’ 
rose rapidly from around 8% in 2003 to almost 30% in 2007 – here the marked 
escalation was in credit card and consumer, rather than housing, debt.63
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Households do not only engage in financial markets as debtors, but also as investors. Since 
the 1980s and 1990s, many governments have been pushing reforms encouraging (for 
example, with tax incentives) the adoption of private ‘individual retirement plans’. There 
has been a drift away from ‘pay-as-you-go’ or PAYG (where retirees or pensioners are paid 
with taxes and contributions from people currently working) towards ‘partially-funded’ or 
‘fully-funded’ (in which contributions are invested in a fund, later used to pay benefits) 
systems. As such, retirement savings have been channelled into financial institutions. 
Even those countries (e.g. France) that maintain relatively large public pension systems 
have been gradually changing from PAYG to investing state funds in financial markets. 
At the same time, within companies, there has also been a shift from ‘defined benefit’ to 
‘defined contribution’ type plans, which has implied the transfer of risk from employer 
to employee. Under defined benefit plans, the employer or company provides pensions 
for its employees. It bears the financial risks and has to pay its workers as promised 
even when its investments don’t perform as expected. With defined contribution plans, 
in contrast, individuals hold their own accounts that incur gains or losses depending 
on investment performance. In sum, pension reform has converted many workers into 
investors with a direct stake in the performance of stocks and bonds. 
All in all, through debt, pension and other types of savings, households have become 
more closely involved in financial markets. This implies a cultural transformation in which 
households are supposed to adopt a “finance rationality”. In making decisions about 
which pension plan to choose, the type of savings scheme to invest in, between variable 
and fixed interest rate loans, and so forth, the individual or family is expected to act as 
a rational financial actor, analysing and calculating the costs and benefits of different 
options. In short, he or she should behave as any other investor. Above all, the individual 
worker or household should allegedly assume financial risks and take responsibility for 
his or her own future. 
Indeed, the mounting reliance of households on financial markets is the corollary of a 
total or partial withdrawal of state provisions such as pensions and other types of social 
security, subsidised housing, health, and education. It is about “the transfer of risk and 
responsibility from the collective to the individual”64. With this in mind, many governments 
and institutions have been aggressively advocating ‘financial literacy’ for everyone. 
Neoliberal discourse calls this ‘financial empowerment’. However, the result has been to 
“naturalize ideas about self-reliance and to depoliticize more specific questions about the 
privatization of risk”65.
The mounting reliance of households on financial markets is the 
corollary of a total or partial withdrawal of state provisions such as 
pensions and other types of social security, subsidised housing, health, 
and education. It is about “the transfer of risk and responsibility from 
the collective to the individual”.
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17. How did financialisation become  
 so dominant? 
Financialisation is not something that simply occurred. Political decisions or non-decisions 
permitted the process of financialisation to take-off and continue apace. Although 
deregulation responded, in part, to ‘regulatory arbitrage’ and loopholes that some 
corporations were already taking advantage of, policies at national and international level 
also actively encouraged activities and changes that buttressed financialisation. Finally, 
non-action, such as the refusal to intervene in financial activities that are potentially 
destabilising, has been at least as important as active policy reform.
Neoliberal policy, in particular, bolstered financialisation66. The focus in the last few 
decades on maintaining low inflation, as opposed to the post-war Keynesian era 
macroeconomic goal of maintaining full employment, has particularly benefited the 
financial sector because inflation erodes the value of financial assets. Of course, inflation 
affects everyone; it eats away at savings and makes salaries lose their purchasing power, 
but the priority it has been given, the goals that have been set and the methods (austerity 
or interest rate hikes) by which it has been contained, skew benefits to the financial sector. 
A rise in interest rates, for example, worsens debt loads (for governments, companies 
and homes) and can contribute to a stifling of growth as a result of increasing credit costs. 
Yet at the same time, high interest rates tend to benefit the financial sector and may 
encourage investors to flock to financial assets at the expense of long-term productive 
investment in the ‘real’ economy.
The relation between financial gain and interest rates, however, is not straightforward. 
It is important to note that it was extremely low interest rates that initially fuelled the 
financial bubble in the USA. Financial institutions took advantage of low Federal Funds 
Rates by leveraging their investments. This is reflected in the high levels of debt taken on 
by these firms during the boom.
Some governments have become resigned to such economic policies, arguing that they 
have little choice in the matter. Once financial liberalisation has taken place and capital is 
unshackled from its chains, national policy autonomy is limited to an extent. On the one 
hand, the ability to tap into private financial sources depends on ‘creditworthiness’ as 
assessed by international institutions and rating agencies. On the other hand, countries 
that don’t comply with investor interests are punished by ‘capital flight’ where investors 
take their money out of a country to pursue greater returns elsewhere. 
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There are, however, significant differences between countries in this regard, depending 
on global political economic positioning and power. Some governments are more 
restrained by capital market valuations than others, while how countries respond to 
these pressures depends upon outcomes of conflicts and negotiations between different 
actors within specific contexts. Examining the case of Argentina, Jiménez observes that 
neoliberal restructuring in the 1990s “reflected an alliance of political power between 
the state and transnational financial power at the expense of industry”. Financialisation, 
she argues, was imposed by a particular coalition of interest groups who intended to 
encourage a finance-led growth regime in the Argentine economy. This created a boom 
in the mid-nineties followed by a bust in 200167. 
Many economists celebrate the restrictions imposed on public policy through capital 
mobility; Thomas Friedman for example, calls this the “golden straitjacket”. From this 
point of view, capital mobility serves as a ‘disciplinary instrument’, forcing governments to 
adopt the ‘appropriate’ monetary and fiscal policies such as balanced budgets (which may 
require harsh austerity measures), low inflation, generous tax codes, and deregulated 
financial markets. Ironically, rules of fiscal austerity do not apply in an event of a financial 
crisis in which the government is expected to bail out private investors and institutions. 
Thus market discipline dictates not the desired amount of government spending, but the 
desired form: budgets which include funds for health, education, or social security, for 
example, are seen as objectionable, whilst in the case of a financial crisis the government 
is expected to empty its purse. 
The financial institution bailouts imposed by the US and various European country 
governments following the 2008 crisis are a good example. In autumn 2008 US Congress 
passed the Troubled Asset Relief Program or TARP, which provided up to $700 billion 
USD for buying up or insuring ‘troubled’ financial assets68. For Palley, the purpose was not 
necessarily to save investors from incurring loss, but to prevent a wider crisis, since under 
financialisation the fortunes of the broader economy depend on the financial system. 
Thus market discipline dictates not the desired amount of 
government spending, but the desired form: budgets which 
include funds for health, education, or social security, for 
example, are seen as objectionable, whilst in the case of a 
financial crisis the government is expected to empty its purse. 
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Despite the US governments’ injection of cash, the financial system remained reticent to 
lend and the ‘credit crunch’ dragged on. At the same time, financial institutions quickly 
recovered profitability and were not so reticent about paying out large ‘rewards’ to their 
top employees.
18. How have political and economic interests  
 promoted financialisation?
Notwithstanding those examples where regulators choices were (apparently) 
constrained, there are countless cases from across the world that clearly point to political 
and economic interests as the ultimate determinants in financially biased policymaking. 
Pension reform is a good example. In many countries an ageing population is said to pose 
an imminent risk of a pension crisis. There are many different possible solutions to this 
problem, but un-coincidentally most governments have veered in the same direction: a 
closer integration of the pension system with global financial markets. Put simply, more 
and more people’s retirement savings are now invested in capital markets. 
This has three main impacts favourable to financial firms. First, it provides them with 
new income and profit channels. Second, in contributing to demand for financial assets 
it encourages asset price inflation that props up finance-led accumulation. Third, the 
growing number of individuals with a stake in the financial markets facilitates support 
for policies that end up benefitting large financial firms. Financialised pension regimes 
help to cultivate a culture of finance among the population that normalises the finance-
dominated society in which we live. 
One of the countries with the worst fame for its politicians pandering to financial sector 
interests is the USA. Apart from the extensive congressional lobbying by big banks and the 
huge sums financiers ‘donate’ to political campaigns, there is a ‘revolving door’ between 
Wall Street and Washington, in which individuals move between positions as politicians 
and regulators and high-end jobs in the financial sector. 
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CASE STUDY 
The Enron Lobby
Froud et al.’s case study of the ‘financialised’ US Enron Corporation is 
instructive. Enron’s senior managers were from the regional Texan elite, with 
strategic national connections. Kenneth Lay, the CEO of Enron, was an expert 
lobbyist. Enron made donations to both political parties. These connections 
helped Enron push for deregulation of the energy sector, especially in relation 
to financial trading. 
For example, in 1993 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
exempted energy derivatives from government supervision. The Chair of 
the Commission at the time was Wendy Gramm, who left her position after 
making this decision and a few weeks later became a member of the Enron 
Board. Enron was also behind legal reform “which limited the amount that 
companies would have to pay out as damages in the event of conviction”. 
When Enron went into bankruptcy at the end of 2001, the same people who 
had received generous offerings from the firm were expected to investigate 
the company for fraud. 212 of the 248 Senators and members of the House of 
Representatives involved in committees investigating Enron’s collapse or the 
conduct of Andersen (Enron’s accounting firm) had received donations from 
one or both companies.
In 2004, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) heeded to the largest 
investment banks’ lobby for an exemption from the established ‘net capital rule’. The 
regulation required brokers to maintain a certain level of liquid asset reserves relative 
to their liabilities, ensuring their ability to meet payments even under unforeseen 
circumstances of severe investment losses. In effect, the regulation limited the amount 
of debt the brokers could take on and thus restricted their participation in lucrative 
leveraging strategies; it also tied up money in reserves that could otherwise be used for 
different profiteering ventures. From the investment bank’s perspective, then, this was 
something worth lobbying about. The exemption was eventually applied to big investor 
banks with assets of more than $5 billion USD. In exchange for being released from these 
rules, the banks promised to allow the commission access to their books, but the SEC 
basically left them to self-regulate. These decisions were later questioned in light of the 
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2008 crisis and the enormous amount of tax-payer money spent on bailing out large 
investment banks69. It is worth noting that one of the big investment banks pressuring for 
this change was Goldman Sachs, which at the time was headed by Henry Paulson, who in 
2006 became Treasury Secretary of the USA. In 2008, Paulson supported the government 
move to use public money to cover private financial losses, including those of Goldman 
Sachs.
In most countries, gestures of reform since the financial crisis have been meagre – at 
best. Without a significant change in power dynamics, it is unlikely that governments will 
do much to halt the financialisation process. Indeed, financial institutions’ profitability 
recovered not long after the financial meltdown, and some of these profits were quickly 
put to work lobbying congress to block reforms considered detrimental to their interests.
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19. What is ‘financial democracy’ and  
 why is it problematic?
The growing involvement of ‘ordinary’ people in financial markets is sometimes celebrated 
as the dawn of a ‘financial’ or ‘investor’ democracy. Wealth is supposedly constantly 
redistributed from corporations to the millions of worker shareowners. Policies that 
favour Wall Street or the City now allegedly represent the public good instead of a narrow 
minority. 
Yet only a small percentage of the population is able to invest enough savings for 
financial gains to be truly relevant. The impression made by the statistic of more than 
half of North Americans having a ‘stake in’ the financial markets quickly deflates when 
considering that 40% of stockowners hold only ‘negligible’ amounts in shares: “70 per 
cent of US households still own few or no stocks”70. In sum, most people do not benefit in 
a significant way from rising share prices or increasing dividend payments. Furthermore, 
the notion of financial democracy distracts from the fact that the sector is actually highly 
concentrated. If before the crisis many institutions were considered ‘too big to fail’, this 
only worsened with restructurings: as of 2009 just five investment banks controlled 37% 
of financial assets in the USA71.
Still, the mere impression of financial democracy, regardless of the fact that it is not backed 
by the figures, consolidates the hegemony of finance: “As investors, many workers now 
appear to have a direct material interest in neoliberal policies such as capital mobility, 
price stability, low capital-gains tax and shareholder value”72. In reality the losses suffered 
by the majority under these policies are more than the measly gains obtained from them. 
The financial democracy thesis is also questionable given that workers and large 
corporations are clearly un-equals in the finance game. Most big firms cannot easily be 
taken advantage of by financial institutions given they have a similar level of power and 
information access, but individuals often use finance to meet basic needs and may have 
few alternatives. For example, a company may take out credit as part of a calculated 
leveraging strategy (i.e. in order to multiply gains), whilst an individual may have little 
option but to take on a student loan or even use a credit card to pay for groceries 
when his or her derisory salary runs out. Furthermore, workers continue to be mere 
consumers of financial products, while large firms have the capacity not only to buy in the 
financial markets, but also to sell. Finally, “limited liability” gives corporations exceptional 
power compared to the household: unlike workers, the homes of shareholders are not 
expropriated in order to pay the debts of an insolvent company. There is clear evidence of 
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this inequality when considering the outcome of the Great Recession: a lot of families lost 
homes and jobs, while the State used public funds to rescue many companies.  
For Bryan, Martin and Rafferty, far from constituting a “financial democracy”, financialisation 
can be likened to an “enclosure” of the household: “the realm of reproduction and 
domesticity” has been converted into “a scene for further accumulation”. In many cases, 
households are forced to work more (additional employment or overtime, e.g.) in order to 
sustain growing levels of debt. As argued by Lapavitsas, there is an “evident contradiction 
at the core of this phenomenon”: the growing reliance of banks on extracting profit 
from worker’s income corresponds with stagnating real wages – in essence, it is not a 
sustainable strategy as eventually workers may not be able to meet debt payments, which 
can lead to wider economic crisis, as in the 2007-08 housing market crash. 
Despite hopes that greater financial inclusion and literacy could foster wealth creation (by 
channelling idle savings directly into capital markets) that filters to all rungs of society, and 
could even provide a mechanism for people (as equity holders) to hold large companies 
to account, the practice has turned out quite differently. Instead, ‘financial democracy’ has 
meant the money of the many fuelling the profits of the few.
20. How can financialisation be resisted?
Financialisation has imposed new pressures on everyday life and made old pressures 
worse. But it has also opened up new possibilities for resistance. 
One is debt itself 73. Just as striking coal miners once used their access to the engine of 
the economy - coal - to flip the balance of power and demand better conditions, so now 
debtors can use their access to credit by declaring a debt strike. A refusal to accept unfair 
quantities of debt lumbered on people in financialised economies can force creditors to 
back down or change their terms of payment. In early 2015, a group of 15 students in USA 
refused to pay back the student loans they took out to attend the for-profit Corinthian 
colleges. Outstanding student debt in America is over $1 trillion and organisations like 
Strike Debt and the Debt Collective hope to organise mass refusals to help counter the 
debt-laden financialised norms they live under. Refusing repayment and demanding a 
write-off of debt is not unfamiliar and has a long history. Anthropologist David Graeber’s 
thorough history Debt: The first 5000 years, shows how debt jubilees have been common 
since the debt slates were wiped clean in ancient Mesopotamia. 
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Another route of resistance is the attempt by campaigners to foster solidarity, and a 
sense of collective identity among debtors. Rolling Jubilee, a collective that grew out of 
Occupy Wall Street, is using the financial markets to this end. It is organising debt jubilees 
by collecting donations to buy distressed personal debt (money that banks have given up 
trying to collect) at discount on the secondary debt market. Instead of allowing it to fall 
into the hands of debt collectors, the group steps in, buys the debt and writes it off. Those 
who have had their outstanding loans cleared are then encouraged to donate to keep it 
moving. Because the debt is worth much less than the value of the initial loan, they are 
able to buy up large quantities. By March 2015 Rolling Jubilee had raised over $70,000 to 
abolish almost $32 million of distressed debt. They hope that such actions will make even 
more radical debt strikes possible.   
Another way of exercising pressure on large banks is by simply “moving your money” 
to smaller institutions with different operating logics. The Move Your Money campaign 
created a “Bank Ranking Scorecard”, which ranks UK banks and building societies 
according to criteria including “honesty, customer service, culture, impact on the real 
economy and ethics” in order to help consumers decide which institution to hold an 
account with. Crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending, in which individuals lend or donate 
directly to the project or enterprise of their choosing, is also a means of bypassing large 
financial institutions. However, the growing popularity of these schemes puts them at 
risk of corporate takeover; in this sense, it is worth investigating how different platforms 
operate before jumping on the bandwagon.
There are also a number of different campaigns aimed at addressing the problems 
wrought by financialisation. Most of these campaigns focus on lobbying governments to 
regulate specific aspects of the financial industry. For example, the US “Stop Gambling 
on Hunger” and the European campaign against “Food Speculation” (which combines 
the work of a number of civil society organisations and NGOs) have been pressuring for 
the introduction of new rules to roll back the financialisation of agricultural commodity 
markets. The latter campaign contributed to the European Union’s decision to impose 
position limits, capping the number of contracts on agricultural commodities that any one 
financial trader or group of traders can hold. Unfortunately, opposition to the regulations, 
especially from the UK government, watered down the agreement and left key loopholes 
open74. There are also multiple campaigns for implementing or strengthening more 
general financial transaction or “Tobin” taxes, aimed at stifling speculation.
We have outlined just a few channels through which financialisation is being challenged. 
Throughout history people have responded to coercion in creative and unexpected ways. 
Just as financialisation is a recent historical phenomenon, so resistance to it has just begun.
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Global financial markets have expanded massively in recent decades, 
dwarfing ‘real’ production and trade and impacting on multiple aspects 
of our economy, society and environment. 
The global financial crisis of 2008 sounded the alarm bells about the 
dangers of an unregulated financialised world, but hidden behind the 
seemingly impenetrable jargon of collateralised debt obligations and 
over-the-counter derivatives, it is hard to understand the nature of 
financialisation let alone know how to confront it. In the meantime, 
financialisation of our global economy has continued unchecked.
This primer is a beginner’s guide to financialisation – explaining how 
it works, how it shapes our lives, the forces that lie behind it, and how 
we might start resisting processes that prioritise freedom for capital 
over human rights and democracy.
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